Compare CSX Transportation Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. ___, Nr. 10-235, Slip op. cit. (23 June 2011) (Ginsburg, J., for the Court) (also based on previous judicial interpretations and the purpose of the Act), CSX Transportation Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. ___, No. 10-235, folio op. cit. (23 June 2011) (Roberts, C.J., different) (Noting the absence of the requisite intent of Congress in the language of law and considering that if the phrase “in whole or in part” was intended to influence a common law rule, it was intended to authorize actions for contributory negligence, not to relax restrictions in the vicinity.) It might be questioned whether taking into account the abilities and limitations of agents falls within the scope of legal interpretation theory.
It may be, for example, that the right place to examine bias and judges` limitations is the theory of jurisprudence. Let us leave aside this largely terminological question. Instead, in the theory of legal interpretation, we can distinguish different degrees and types of idealization. For example, a highly idealized type of theory asks how a legal interpreter, without cognitive or temporal constraints, best determines what the law obtains as legally and morally admissible evidence (without regard to values other than accuracy, except for limiting it to admissible evidence). A somewhat less idealized type of theory asks how agents with specific abilities and limitations would be best able to accurately identify the contributions of dispositions under real-world conditions, including a limited amount of time. Finally, we can ask ourselves how a legal interpreter should proceed, taking into account not only accuracy, but also the values presented above, such as: promoting good writing. In this case, a person bit a person`s nose. A criminal complaint was filed before the court, in which the court applied the rule of literal interpretation and concluded that the act of biting by the defendant does not fall within the concept of cutting or stab wounding, since these words imply that an instrument must be used. In this case, however, no instrument is used by the defendant. Therefore, the accused was not guilty and acquitted. Thus, if Hart`s theory is true, in order to defend a preferred theory of legal interpretation, a theorist must either argue: (1) that the manner in which the theory contributes a provision to the content of the law is included in the recognition rule because it is treated as correct by a large majority of judges; or (2) the manner in which the doctrine contributes a provision to the content of the law is confirmed by a test which, in turn, is considered correct by a large majority of judges.  This would be a difficult task.
(Since these are the only two possibilities that Hart`s account allows, to the extent that there is no consensus on a theory of legal interpretation and no consensus criteria validating a particular theory of interpretation, it is unclear which theory of interpretation is correct.)  Methods of interpretation other than textualism and intentionalism, such as “pragmatism,” “purposivism,” and “practical thinking,” are generally more open to examining the functional implications of a particular decision, circumstances changed since the passage of a law, how the current Congress might view an issue, and the general objectives of Congress when passing a particular law. With respect to objectives, Justice Breyer wrote that a deliberate approach to interpretation “contributes to advancing the democratic objectives of the Constitution. helps individual statutes work better for those Congress wanted to help. [and] help Congress do its own legislative work better.” Stephen Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work: A Judge`s View, 94, 96 (2010). The most important arguments in favour of this understanding of legal interpretation are the main arguments against linguistic understanding of meaning and dispute resolution. If the purpose of interpreting the law is to resolve many disputes, and judges are generally required to follow the law, then the interpretation of the law (assuming that there are often relevant legal norms) must at least give rise to the content of the law. On the other hand, theories of legal interpretation do not contain elements that would be necessary if they were theories for the general settlement of disputes. Although the term “legal interpretation” is often used vaguely and sometimes in a manner that encompasses activities such as interstitial law-making, when carefully distinguishing the various activities required to resolve disputes, few would classify them all as part of legal interpretation. For example, it would extend the term beyond recognition to categorize the decision to refuse to follow the law as an interpretation of the law. The following external tools are used to interpret the law: But in that case, the court gave a broader interpretation of the term QUESTION, saying no one should profit from a crime. Here the son murdered his mother so that his descendants would not profit from the crime, which the court decided to give the property in favor of the mother`s parents.
The “new originalists” (see Section 3) explicitly advocate the use of the term “constitutional interpretation” for the process of discovering the meaning of the constitutional text (distinct from “constitutional construction,” an “essentially creative” process of constructing meaning). But, with the important exception of Larry Solum (2010), it is clear from their writings that they do not systematically use the term “meaning” to refer to linguistic meaning, but often seem to have in mind, for example, a legal norm or an understanding of how a legal norm applies to certain cases (e.g., Whittington 1999a, 5-11; Barnett, 2013, p. 419). See Section 4.2 for more examples. As suggested below, it can be argued that their views can be better constructed in such a way that the interpretation of the statute is directed to the content of the statute that they consider to be of “public importance”. The rule set forth in the Convention is essentially that the text of a treaty is authentic, unless it leaves the meaning of the treaty unclear or leads to a manifestly absurd or unreasonable result. The use of “complementary means of interpretation” is only allowed in this case, as in the case of preparatory work, also called preparatory work in French. In the previous subsection, I relied on the simplistic assumption that, while the interpretation of the statute is directed at the content of the statute, the appropriateness of a method of legal interpretation depends solely on whether it treats the determinants of the content of the statute as a contribution to the content of the statute in the way they actually do. According to this assumption, there is no gap between a legal theory and a theory of legal interpretation. If the correct legal theory is that the content of the law is determined, for example, by the semantic content of the relevant legal texts, then the best method of legal interpretation is to determine the semantic content of authoritative legal texts.
But again, the context may render the principle unworkable. A statutory listing can be “exemplary, not exclusive,” the court once concluded.114 In one case, a provision in the Fair Debt Collection Act (FDCA) allowed attorneys` fees and costs to be awarded to defendants sued in bad faith for the purpose of harassment.115 If this provision negatively implied that in cases where bad faith and harassment were not involved, successful defendants No costs could be awarded? The majority of the Court concluded that costs could indeed be awarded in those cases. According to the court, the canon expressio unius applies only if it can be assumed that Congress considered broader coverage but rejected it. In this case, the general rules for allocating costs, the prevalence of layoffs in provisions for expenses, and certain aspects of the legal structure suggested that the FDCA should not categorically exclude the decision on costs for a group of successful defendants in the FDCA`s actions. If the views of a subsequent Congress are expressed in a duly enacted law, the views contained in that law must be interpreted and applied. Sometimes a subsequent law declares the intention of Congress to interpret a previous law, rather than directly amending or clarifying the previous law.